For some years now, buying and selling drugs through chat platforms has become an extremely common practice in Argentina. There are at least two methodologies: transactions with acquaintances and transactions with strangers.
With acquaintances it is simple and usually limited to marijuana: a grower sets up a broadcast list and sends updates to a circle of trust. They operate with few reservations because they know each person who buys from them. And if they do not know them, it is because they arrived through a referral from the group.
Selling to strangers, on the other hand, tends to involve other twists. It is generally done through Telegram groups and always involves some premium genetics, hydroponic cultivation, and other modern techniques that allow selling a gram for around 8-12 USD (someday we should build a price aggregator). Other products from the drug market are also offered: ecstasy pills, tusi, cocaine, ketamine, and a long et cetera. In other words, let us say, amphetamine cut under different names (?). In these groups, users are usually required to avoid personal identification and remain anonymous, under threat of doxxing.
Deliveries are generally made in a delivery format and transactions are carried out in cash, cryptocurrencies, or with digital wallets, depending on the level of paranoia on both sides. So far, nothing unusual. In fact, this practice has become so popular that academic literature exists on the subject. Matias Dewey and Andres Buzzetti published in 2023 this paper on how the emergence of pseudo-anonymous chat platforms, such as Telegram, enabled the flourishing of online drug trade in Argentina.
It is likely that the creation of Reprocann increased the leniency of security forces toward this kind of "retail drug dealing" backed by a tacit laissez faire, laissez passer. However, and despite the fact that it may not happen as frequently, the police have the necessary tools to monitor networks in search of crimes.
While this stance is not new, the recent circular from the Ministry of Security 428/2024, regarding "cyberpatrolling", reinforces the possibilities in this regard. The police are authorized to conduct open source intelligence. Or as it is known in English: OSINT (Open Source Intelligence).
(OSINT) Open Source Criminal Intelligence in Argentina
ARTICLE 1.- The Federal Police and Security Forces shall adjust their conduct to the following guidelines, principles, criteria, recommendations, and directives for the preventive tasks of crimes that take place in cyber environments. Said preventive tasks shall be carried out solely through the use of publicly accessible websites and open digital sources, understood as the means and platforms of digital information and communication of a public, non-sensitive nature and without security classification, whose access does not imply a transgression of the right to privacy of individuals, in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Law No. 25,326 and its regulatory norms.
Open source intelligence is one of the most common varieties for gathering public information from users registered on digital networks. While this is not a novelty, taking into account the security profile developed by Minister Patricia Bullrich and the recent cooperation of foreign intelligence agencies alongside local ones, it is reasonable to assume there will be an increase in efforts in this direction.
In this sense, resolution 428/2024 establishes in its Article 2 that "the Federal Police and Security Forces shall carry out preventive work in cyberspace" in relation to a series of issues, the first of which mentioned are "infractions and behaviors covered by Law No. 23,737."
It is worth remembering that Law No. 23,737 is the well-known "Drug Law". Therefore, based on this resolution and the "tough" profile that the Minister of Security has developed regarding the trade of illegal drugs, it is very likely that there will be a considerable increase in surveillance across different chat systems such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and even Discord.
The current government's closeness to agencies such as the CIA or Israeli intelligence (whose main espionage export product is the software Pegasus) suggests that both the new local intelligence apparatus and the security forces are beginning to receive greater training in this area.
An Argentine Minority Report
Added to this is the latest update on this topic, which is the decision by security forces to begin "automating" these sweeps through "artificial intelligence." The resolution in question is 710/2024, which establishes:
ARTICLE 1.- The ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPLIED TO SECURITY (UIAAS) is hereby created, which shall operate within the Cybercrime and Cyber Affairs Directorate under the ADVISORY CABINET UNIT.
ARTICLE 2.- The ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPLIED TO SECURITY (UIAAS) shall be headed by the Director of Cybercrime and Cyber Affairs and composed of the relevant areas of the Federal Police and Security Forces, whose representatives shall be designated by the highest authority of each of those forces.
Essentially, the regulation establishes the legal framework for the use of a potential tool that would allow for a somewhat automated and scalable analysis of the immense volumes of information generated on different social platforms, especially instant messaging ones. The news seems straight out of Minority Report, the short story by Philip K. Dick where the police have a crime anticipation division.
With the creation of a regulatory framework that allows it and the emergence of new players in criminal investigation, it is likely that the collection and analysis of open source data will become a trend in the short and medium term. Although it is also worth clarifying that, while the conditions are in place, this is still Argentina and many of these grandiose declarations end up clashing with the budgetary and administrative reality of the institutions that must implement them.
Beyond that, it is advisable for those who use these exchange channels to take into account the new "metagame" guidelines and increase precautions regarding the rather casual approaches to information and/or money exchanges when it comes to practices that, while tolerated until now, are openly illegal.
Reform of the Argentine Federal Police 2025
As was plausible to anticipate based on what was outlined above, on Tuesday, June 17, 2025, the Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich, announced a series of measures (published in the Official Gazette) aimed at equipping the Federal Police with new legal tools that would allow them to carry out cyberpatrolling activities without the need for prior judicial authorization. We read in point number 11, of article 6 of the Annex of the new decree:
11.- To carry out, without the need for judicial authorization, crime prevention tasks in digital public spaces, such as open social networks, public websites, and other open sources, in accordance with the guidelines and guiding principles established for said activities by the competent authority. These crime prevention tasks must respect the protection of personal data, freedom of expression, and the privacy and intimacy of individuals.
This is part of a complete administrative and functional restructuring of the Federal Police, through decree 383/2025 which directly modifies and replaces the previous 1958 decree that had determined its organization and functions. Within this framework, the aim is to transform the Federal Police into an investigative agency that monitors the entire federal territory in a manner equivalent to the American FBI, incorporating new tools, administrative structures, and competencies.
It is within this reform that the previously mentioned trend in this article is reinforced, granting greater autonomy to the Federal Police in cyberpatrolling tasks, which it will be able to conduct independently without needing to inform a judge. That is to say, within the framework of "respect for the privacy and intimacy of individuals," the police will be able to build their own databases, collect public information, and in this way "profile" each citizen according to their investigation needs.
An approach that has already been criticized by various human rights organizations, given its flexibility, but which is not a novelty. Rather, it intensifies a direction already taken by the National Government long ago: increasing digital surveillance systems over the population amid an exponential increase in the availability of electronic tools.
It remains to be seen (and only time will tell) whether these new criminal investigation tools will also be used for political purposes.